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Technology policies have a dual character. They are technical instruments for 
addressing important contracting failures affecting technology acquisition and at the 
same time they are interventions that inevitably create new sources of incomes or 
rents. These two aspects of technology policies are closely related because the 
intensity and effectiveness of the rent-seeking strategies of different organizations can 
explain why particular technology policies are effective or ineffective. One of the 
puzzles in global comparisons of the performance of technology policies is that 
policies that worked well in one context fared less well in others, and policies with 
apparently inferior design characteristics worked better in some contexts compared to 
policies that were more straightforward. We can make sense of these paradoxes by 
examining the policies in question in the context of the organizations affected by the 
policy. The ‘political settlement’ is our shorthand for describing the distribution of 
bargaining power and technical capabilities across the relevant organizations in that 
society. A specific technology policy generates rents across different organizations 
and requires these rents to be allocated and managed in particular ways to achieve the 
desired outcomes. The political settlement describing the relative power of different 
organizations can therefore help to explain why the outcomes of similar policies can 
vary significantly across contexts. This analysis can also help to design better policies 
in countries in Africa and Asia that have had mixed experiences with technology 
policies in the past.  
 
In their role as technical instruments, technology policies (or industrial policies) 
address contracting failures constraining the adoption and learning of new 
technologies. A variety of factors can prevent investors, financiers, technology 
providers and firms from privately contracting to transfer new technologies to 
developing countries. Clearly, the first requirement for a successful technology policy 
is that the policy should address the specific problem affecting technology acquisition 
in a country or sector at that time. As there are potentially a number of quite different 
contracting failures that could affect technology adoption, a policy designed to solve 
one type of problem may be inappropriate for another. Technology policy can 
therefore fail if its design does not address the most important problems that are 
actually constraining technology adoption in that context.  
 
However, even if the policy was technically appropriate it could still fail if it was not 
effectively implemented and managed. The problem of implementation has been 
widely recognized, but the problem has been usually explained in terms of a broad 
binary distinction between the capacities of effective (developmental) states and other 
ineffective types of states. A common conclusion is that a country without a 
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developmental state should not attempt industrial policy, or it should first construct 
the relevant aspects of a developmental state. Technology policies clearly played an 
important role in the East Asian success stories of the 1960s and 1970s and yet similar 
policies achieved less impressive results in many other developing countries. The 
differences in outcomes can be linked to differences in the degree to which subsidies 
and support were linked to the achievement of outcomes, with corresponding 
penalties for non-performance. The East Asian countries undoubtedly had effective 
developmental states that could discipline subsidy recipients and enforce performance 
conditions while providing support for technology adoption (Amsden 1989; World 
Bank 1993; Chang 1994). The problem is that the construction of significant aspects 
of a similar developmental state is not a feasible goal for most developing countries. 
If industrial policy requires such a state, and if East Asian technology policies were 
the only ones that could accelerate technology adoption, most developing countries 
should indeed refrain from attempting such policies. This is the conclusion of many 
economists who do not reject the evidence of successful industrial policies in East 
Asia but who nevertheless believe that such policies may have a negative effect in 
most other developing countries.  
 
Fortunately, this conclusion may be too pessimistic. To see why, we need to look at 
the other aspect of industrial policy: its link with rent generation and ‘rent-seeking’ 
strategies. The organizations benefiting from technology policy rents can be expected 
to attempt to capture and protect the streams of income associated with these 
interventions. However, societies have different configurations of power and 
capabilities across their economic, political and bureaucratic organizations. As 
organizations try to capture and protect the rents associated with particular policies, 
the feasibility of enforcing the conditions that are most likely to yield good results for 
that policy can vary widely across societies as the relative power of the relevant 
organizations is different. Thus, the results achieved will depend on the ‘fit’ between 
the particular policy (and specifically the rent allocation and management that it 
requires) and the organizational configuration in which it is placed. The 
‘developmental state’ describes a particular configuration of power between political, 
bureaucratic and economic organizations (a particular political settlement) and this 
allowed the enforcement of a range of ambitious industrial policy instruments. In 
South Korea in particular, significant rents were allocated to large firms across a 
number of sectors with performance conditions that were credible. Non-performance 
resulted not only in changes in the relevant policies and the withdrawal of the rents 
that were not working, but on occasion involved the re-allocation of entire plants to 
new managements and ownership.  
 
However, countries like India, Bangladesh, Thailand and Malaysia had different 
configurations of organizational power and capabilities that were significantly 
different from the East Asian developmental states (as well as being different from 
each other). Ambitious industrial policies were also tried in these countries but 
generally produced less dramatic results. Yet these countries also had other variants of 
industrial policies at different times that were sometimes quite successful in 
accelerating technology acquisition in particular sectors (Khan 2000b; Khan and 
Blankenburg 2009; Khan 2013). Different policies were successful because each 
policy created a different configuration of rents and had different requirements of rent 
allocation and management. Some policies were therefore more likely to be effective 
in creating the required combination of incentives and compulsions for technology 
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acquisition given the different configuration of organizational power in each country. 
From a policy point of view, this means that the design of an effective industrial 
policy has to take into account not just the technical question of the specific 
contracting failures that have to be addressed. It also has to account for the specific 
‘political settlement’ in the country because only interventions whose success depends 
on rents being allocated and managed in ways that are feasible in that context are 
likely to achieve desirable outcomes. Section 1 discusses the most important 
contracting failures that technology policies have to address. Section 2 locates the 
problem of policy design in the context of specific political settlements and the rent-
seeking strategies of organizations. Section 3 deals with a particular contracting 
failure that needs to be addressed to ensure that success of technology acquisition in 
developing countries: the problem of developing organizational capabilities for using 
new technologies in competitive ways. Section 4 develops an analytical framework 
showing how effective technology policy design has to take into account the non-
linear relationships of policy variables with the political settlement. The approach is 
able to explain the variable success of technology policies across countries and 
suggests a methodology for policy design in developing countries.  
 
1. Technology Policy and Contracting Failures  
Developing countries face significant constraints and contracting problems that can 
prevent them from adopting existing technologies. These contracting failures are often 
the primary impediment to development. Technology policies refer to policies that 
attempt to overcome or bypass the important contracting failures that may be 
preventing private parties from contracting to adopt and learn new technologies. 
Contracting failures occur because technology adoption is subject to a number of 
externalities and principal-agent problems and private contracting may be unable to 
overcome these problems, particularly in the governance contexts of developing 
countries (Khan 2013). These problems include the externality problems affecting 
investments in workforce skills, externalities facing technology providers bringing 
new technologies to developing countries when these technologies still enjoy 
technology rents, externalities facing first movers investing in sectors that may turn 
out to be competitive, a variety of coordination problems affecting investments across 
sectors and the principal-agent problems facing investors who want to ensure high 
levels of effort when they finance learning-by-doing processes. If private contracting 
fails to find appropriate solutions to these and other problems, policy interventions are 
required. But policy can only be effective if it targets a relevant problem and targets it 
adequately. As each problem is different, interventions that are appropriate for solving 
one type of problem will not work if the underlying problem was a different one.  
 
The importance of designing policy responses so that they address the most important 
contracting failure is discussed in Khan (2013). Developing countries have used a 
variety of mechanisms to accelerate technology acquisition, including the protection 
of domestic markets for infant industries, subsidizing technology acquisition through 
a variety of implicit and explicit subsidies like subsidies on the cost of credit, export 
subsidies and tax breaks on investments in new machinery. Each of these instruments 
provides different types of rents which are associated with solutions to specific 
contracting failures. However, the actual underlying contracting failure will determine 
the conditions that need to be established for different stakeholders if desirable results 
are to be achieved. For instance, if positive externalities were preventing adequate 
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investments in training, subsidies to firms would have to come with arrangements for 
monitoring the quality of training, and the terms of the rent allocation would have to 
include credible withdrawal and penalty arrangements if the training was poor (Dosi 
1988; Khan 2000a). A very different technology problem emerges if external 
technology providers feel their technology rents are threatened by illegal imitation. If 
this slows down the inflow of technologies into the country, the appropriate policy 
response may be to protect the rents of technology owners through patents or to 
provide them with compensating rents in the form of incentives or licensing fees. In 
each case a different set of conditions need to be established on the relevant rents. For 
instance, if incentives are provided to technology providers, the quality and type of 
technologies they transfer have to be monitored, including the pace of subcontracting 
to domestic producers. In the case of patents, regulatory agencies have to have the 
capability to enforce these restrictions but also to negotiate the time period of patent 
protection for each sector to maximize the net benefit for that society (Hoekman, et al. 
2004). In reality, patent protection terms are often determined by more advanced 
countries and these terms do not necessarily protect the interests of developing 
countries (Khan 2000a; Stiglitz 2007).  
 
The first mover problem refers to the possibility that the first investors in a sector may 
discover that the country has a comparative advantage in that sector but may fail to 
capture sufficient benefits themselves to justify the costs and risks of their 
investments in discovery (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003). The discovery of new 
business opportunities obviously has positive externalities for the country but the 
initial investors may not be able to capture much of this. Moreover, subsequent entry 
into the sector can actually reduce their profits by raising wages and input costs. 
Unlike new innovations, discovery cannot be patented, and therefore the solution to 
this contracting failure may require temporary subsidies that encourage trials in new 
sectors. These rents need their own set of effective conditions: they have to be 
available for short periods, no longer than is needed to set up the trials and discover 
the presence or absence of comparative advantage in that sector. For this contracting 
failure, it is critical for the relevant agencies to have the capacity to withdraw rents 
after fixed periods and in any case to desist from continuing to support experiments 
that are clearly not going to produce competitive industries.  
 
Coordination of investments may be important because of both demand and supply 
side complementarities. High transaction costs, information asymmetries and the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour by second movers may preclude private 
contracting solutions to solve coordination problems (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Nurkse 
1953; Scitovsky 1954; Williamson 1985; Murphy, et al. 1989). Public investments in 
coordination also provide rents to private providers but here a different set of 
conditions have to be enforced. Government agencies charged with the 
implementation of coordination policies are in a position to provide rents to firms in 
promoted clusters. The identification of the clusters to be supported and the 
complementary investments that private investors have to provide have to be agreed 
upon, monitored and enforced.  
 
The solutions to all these contracting failures assume that a more fundamental 
contracting failure has been addressed. Developing countries typically find it difficult 
to absorb and use existing technologies even when their wages are low and they have 
sufficient workers with the appropriate formal skills. The missing factor is the 
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organizational capability of the production team. Owners, managers and supervisors 
do not know how to set up the factory, align the machinery, set up systems for quality 
control, reduce input wastage and product rejection, manage inventories, match order 
flows with production cycles, maintain after sales services and a host of other internal 
coordination and management issues that are essential for achieving competitiveness. 
As a result, the firm may be able to buy the machinery at international prices, employ 
the workers and managers at lower wages than the most competitive country, and yet 
be unable to achieve competitiveness. The development of organizational capabilities 
requires the acquisition of tacit knowledge through learning-by-doing. By definition, 
learning-by-doing requires opportunities for doing, and this requires periods of loss-
financing when the firm produces but is unable to make a profit. This period of 
learning can help to raise organizational capabilities if the production team is also 
under pressure to continuously experiment with new internal organizational 
arrangements to raise productivity. Thus, the ‘doing’ is necessary but does not 
guarantee learning, unless there is some compulsion on the owners, managers and 
supervisors to put in high levels of effort in the learning process (Khan 2013).   
 
In theory, sufficiently complex contingency contracts between the private parties 
involved could address these requirements, but their enforcement is not likely to be 
credible in the typical developing country. Essentially, financiers need to have 
credible ways of penalizing non-performance and extracting their capital if the project 
fails. Private contracting of this type typically does not emerge because financiers 
cannot credibly ensure that stakeholders within the firm will put in high levels of 
effort in learning and thereby assure returns on their investments. Technology policy 
can address this failure by co-financing or sharing the risks involved in the learning 
provided governance agencies have the appropriate enforcement capabilities to induce 
appropriate levels of learning effort. The necessary condition for rent allocation here 
is not just that a firm gets the rent that allows it to engage in learning-by-doing, but 
also that the conditions of rent withdrawal are clearly set out so that owners, 
managers, supervisors and others feel the compulsion to put in a high level of effort in 
the learning process. This problem usually cannot be solved by announcing the time 
period for support in advance. Unlike a trial that is supposed to discover comparative 
advantage (and reasonable time periods for trials can be pre-specified), here 
comparative advantage is being created through learning and the development of 
organizational capabilities. The creation of comparative advantage can take much 
longer and the time period may differ from country to country, sector to sector, and 
perhaps even firm to firm. More complex monitoring and incentives have to be 
created here to induce the right kinds of effort.  
 
Given the different problems that technology policies may be required to solve, and 
the very different governance and institutional conditions that each requires, one 
reason why effective policies cannot have a standard design across countries is simply 
because they must address different problems and priorities. Without careful attention 
to identifying the major problems the country faces, and designing the rent monitoring 
and allocation conditions accordingly, a general policy of supporting infant industries 
can produce very variable outcomes. In some cases, the requisite conditions for 
solving the underlying problems could fortuitously be in place, and in others not. In 
some countries, famously the East Asian ones, ambitious technology policies that 
provided support simultaneously for many firms and sectors resulted in accelerated 
technology acquisition and development. In others, similar policies resulted in the 
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proliferation of subsidies to protected industries that refused to grow up. Subsidies 
kept growing and could not be withdrawn despite the poor performance of the 
supported firms and sectors. Similarly, in some countries, development banks played 
a dynamic role, while in others they closed down because their low interest loans 
were not repaid and their bad debts escalated. In the less dynamic cases, consumers 
and taxpayers paid the price of these failing policies till they were finally abandoned.  
 
The identification of the relevant contracting failure is the first stage of finding an 
effective solution to a technology acquisition problem. The second stage is to 
investigate whether a policy with the requisite characteristics can be enforced given 
the power and capabilities of the organizations affected. Here again there is a degree 
of openness, but now the openness can create opportunities as well as problems. On 
the one hand, obvious policy responses that worked in some other country may not be 
implementable because the configuration of power may be such that the policy would 
be excessively distorted by rent-seeking activities and desirable outcomes may not 
emerge. On the other hand, there are typically multiple solutions to the same problem 
and each solution implies a different allocation of rents and a somewhat different set 
of conditions for achieving desirable outcomes. This makes it more likely that an 
effective solution can be found despite differences in the political settlement. The 
problem of finding a solution to a contracting failure that is effective within a specific 
political settlement is a general problem that can affect solutions to any contracting 
failure. We illustrate the general problem with reference to a particular contracting 
failure: the problem of developing organizational capabilities through learning-by-
doing. There is an additional merit in focusing on the learning-by-doing problem. 
Attempts to solve any of the other problems affecting technology acquisition are 
likely to fail if effective organizations that can competitively use the new technologies 
do not yet exist.  
 
2. Political settlements and Rents  
Rents are defined as incomes higher than the minimum a person or organization 
would have accepted, the minimum usually being defined as the income in the next-
best opportunity available to that individual or organization. According to this 
definition, policies that leave some individuals better off create rents for them. 
However, policies can also leave some individuals worse off, so that in effect they 
suffer negative rents, though this is not how these losses are usually described in the 
literature. Taxes for instance leave some individuals worse off, while the 
corresponding subsidies provide rents for others. Any policy intervention will change 
income flows and therefore every policy intervention creates rents, both positive as 
well as negative. In the simple story that is often told in textbooks, in the absence of 
government intervention a zero-rent general equilibrium is possible and serves as the 
benchmark for the analysis of rents. This is because if there were no restrictions on 
entry and exit and all contracts were voluntary, no factor would earn higher or lower 
returns in any activity than in any alternative activity available to that factor, and 
consequently no factor could earn a rent or suffer a ‘negative rent’. If we ignore the 
critical question of where the property rights sustaining a general equilibrium came 
from, and if we ignore the equally critical question of how in the absence of any rents 
the information required for market operations can be discovered, we can claim that if 
such an outcome could be achieved by private contracting, we would also achieve an 
efficient allocation of resources. An efficient allocation of resources is simply one 
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where re-allocation cannot enhance net social benefit and this would be the case if no 
factor was earning a higher or lower return anywhere else. Much of the analysis of 
rents and rent seeking has been hampered by this unnecessary and unrealistic 
benchmark. If we accept the general equilibrium benchmark, deviations from this 
benchmark generate rents and these deviations signal inefficiency.  
 
In reality, as North (1990) and Stiglitz (1996) argue in different ways, the general 
equilibrium benchmark is not only unrealistic, it can be very misleading as a guide for 
policy-making. First, in the institutional economics that North introduced, the creation 
of property rights (for instance over free-access resources) creates rents for owners 
because these streams of property incomes did not exist earlier. Since the role of the 
state is transparent when property rights are newly created, new property rights are 
clearly the product of ‘intervention’. The incremental income streams associated with 
them are therefore the product of intervention and appear as ‘rents’. Indeed 
neoclassical textbooks occasionally describe the income streams that are created when 
open access natural resources become property as rents. Since the absence of property 
rights was associated with free access overuse, the creation of property rights and the 
associated rents are associated with improvements in net social benefits. In fact, free 
access can destroy the value of any asset, not just natural resources, so the incremental 
creation of property rights always creates new income streams (rents) and in many 
cases also enhances net social benefits. Paradoxically, once property rights have 
existed for some time, mainstream economics overlooks the role of the state in 
maintaining these property rights, and the income from property of all types is no 
longer seen as the product of ‘interventions’ and therefore are no longer rents. The 
general equilibrium model extends this to the extreme case where property rights have 
been defined over all possible assets and all these rights are protected at no cost and 
without a state. Property ownership in itself is no longer perceived to have anything to 
do with the state and the returns from property ownership are therefore perceived to 
be quite different from rents that are now only created by interventions that prevent 
factors from being freely allocated. 
  
In reality, property rights are always imperfectly developed because of the high costs 
of defining and protecting many rights. There are differences between advanced and 
developing countries because of differences in the capacities of their states, but the 
proposition is true in general for all countries. Partly for this reason and partly 
because of the high costs of contracting due to asymmetric information and other 
problems, contracting in incomplete markets is also incomplete. In the real world, we 
are never in general equilibrium and a wide variety of rents exist, some of them 
associated with past interventions that enhanced net social benefits and others 
associated with interventions that reduced them. Stiglitz (1996) therefore argues that 
incremental interventions can potentially raise net social benefit even though they will 
be associated with the creation of new rents. We can re-state this as follows: The 
appropriate benchmark for evaluating rents is not the zero-rent general equilibrium 
that never existed and can never be reached but the currently existing structure of 
rights, interventions and institutional solutions that defines a complex structure of 
rents in the economy. The question is whether an incremental intervention that creates 
an incremental rent is associated with a positive or negative incremental change in net 
social benefits in this context. Interventions and rents that are associated with positive 
incremental outcomes are desirable even if they create rents.  
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The incremental rents framework should not be confused with an analysis of rents that 
takes the zero-rents general equilibrium as its benchmark. The alternative framework 
does not presume either that a general equilibrium is feasible or that movements in 
that direction are necessarily beneficial. It certainly does not explain rents in terms of 
market restrictions causing deviations from that (unrealistic) benchmark. Rather, the 
incremental rents framework seeks to identify and analyse the changes in rents 
associated with specific policies. These rents identify the direct beneficiaries of a 
policy so that we can begin to assess the plausibility of subjecting them to the 
conditions theoretically required for the policy to be effective. The actual outcome of 
the policy depends on how effectively rent seeking by the organizations benefiting 
from the rents can prevent or distort the imposition of the conditions that are required 
for socially desirable outcomes to emerge. The likelihood of that in turn depends on 
the interests and holding power of the organizations involved, and this information is 
therefore also required.  
 
We describe the configuration of capabilities and holding powers across organizations 
as a ‘political settlement’. The configuration of organizational power in a society is 
constantly changing but usually not so rapidly that aspects of continuity cannot be 
identified. Indeed, there are powerful feedback mechanisms between the distribution 
of organizational power in one period, the activities of organizations to protect and 
create institutions and policies to sustain their relative incomes and organizational 
powers during that period, and the reproduction of organizational power as a result of 
these activities in the next period. The distribution of organizational capabilities is 
nevertheless gradually changing but in a path-dependent way, with important aspects 
of continuity. We describe the currently existing macro-system of organizational 
capabilities and powers as a political settlement, and at any given time, countries have 
political settlements with features that are reproducible over time (Khan 2010).  
 
Combining the incremental rent analysis with a description of the political settlement 
allows us to analyse the likelihood of a particular policy achieving its expected 
outcomes. If the organizations affected by that policy are likely to operate as the 
theory expects them to, the expected outcome may be achieved. However, 
organizations have their own interests and capabilities and they may want to modify 
the application of the policy. In particular, they may want to modify the conditions 
under which they gain or lose the incremental rents created by a policy. For this, they 
are likely to engage in rent-seeking activities of different types. For instance, the 
organizations in question may find the formal conditions for acquiring rents to be too 
difficult relative to the alternative of attempting to distort or overcome these 
conditions using appropriate rent-seeking activities. The strategy they actually follow 
will depend on how easy it is to modify or resist the imposition of the formal 
conditions, and that depends on the bargaining power of these organizations relative 
to the governance agencies of the state. If they have the capability to modify the 
policy, the expected outcomes would be unlikely to be achieved. Thus, a policy that 
attempts to make powerful organizations operate in ways that they are likely to 
successfully resist is likely to either fail or achieve much more limited results.  
 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between a technical analysis of expected outcomes of 
policy and an analysis of the likely responses of organizations to the rents created by 
the policy. The ‘standard analysis’ of policy outcomes describes the technical analysis 
of policy responses to contracting failures which typically ignores the problem of 
9 
 
enforcing the conditions required for policy success. This is shown in the shaded 
rectangle in Figure 1. In theory, policy works by changing the incentives and 
compulsions of the relevant parties so that more desirable social outcomes can 
emerge. The changes in incentives and compulsions can be described by the 
incremental rents that are created by the policy and the conditions that organizations 
have to fulfil to gain or lose these rents. The vertical chain of causation described as 
the ‘incremental rent analysis’ is superimposed on this and asks how the organizations 
affected by these rents are likely to respond, given their interests and their bargaining 
power relative to other affected organizations and the agencies enforcing the 
conditions. The result is that the actual rent allocation may differ from the theoretical 
expectation and organizations can also modify the conditions under which the 
relevant rents can be gained or lost. As a result, the actual outcomes achieved may be 
quite different from the outcomes that are theoretically expected. Moreover, as 
political settlements vary across countries, the actual outcomes associated with the 
same policy could be quite different in different contexts.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Rents, Political Settlements and Policy Outcomes  
 
These overlapping analytical questions can be illustrated with reference to a simpler 
set of contracting failures, for instance those that result in persistent pollution 
externalities. In this case, a number of interventions are possible that could enhance 
net social benefits for society. One solution to this contracting failure is a tax 
imposing ‘negative rents’ on polluters. This can reduce the incentive to pollute and 
result in higher net social benefits. However, the success of the tax depends on its 
allocation and management: state agencies have to assess the right tax level, monitor 
polluting activities, collect the appropriate taxes from polluting organizations, and 
prevent evasion or the passing on of these costs to others. These are the required rent 
allocation conditions in this case. Not surprisingly, pollution taxes may not produce 
the desired outcome and a rent analysis may explain why. An obvious problem may 
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be that the theoretical tax allocation and management requirements are not met in 
practice because the organizations that are polluting can use rent-seeking activities to 
effectively distort the monitoring of pollution and the collection of taxes. If many 
polluting organizations have the capability to block the accurate monitoring of their 
activities, to challenge the tax regime legally, or in developing countries, to buy 
themselves political or bureaucratic support to block or evade the policy, the actual 
outcome of the strategy may be far removed from the expected one.  
 
The rent analysis can be extended to policy design and allows us to ask if an 
alternative policy may have generated better outcomes given the political settlement. 
In reality, policy choice (the independent variable on the left in Figure 1) is also to 
some extent the product of the rent-seeking activities of organizations, but to simplify 
we assume with some realism that policy-makers have sufficient freedom to attempt a 
number of different types of policy responses to the same problem. For instance, apart 
from the tax solution, the problem of pollution externalities can be addressed by 
subsidies or by imposing regulatory restrictions on pollution. Consider the subsidy 
solution. Instead of taxing polluters, the subsidy strategy offers polluters rewards for 
reducing pollution. The success of this strategy depends on a very different set of 
monitoring and enforcement capabilities. Some of the monitoring requirements could 
be more demanding because the government has to estimate the pollution that would 
have been created in the absence of the policy, as well as monitoring current pollution 
to reward polluters for the reduction. Powerful organizations can obviously attempt to 
influence this assessment in different ways. However, instead of the difficult task of 
extracting revenue from powerful organizations, the subsidy strategy has the easier 
task of providing organizations with subsidies.  
 
Given the configuration of power, this strategy may produce better outcomes relative 
to a tax strategy, provided some minimal conditions linking the delivery of the 
subsidy to actual pollution reduction could be enforced. This enforcement is more 
likely if after the subsidy and the pollution reduction the relevant organizations are 
better off than they would be if they continued polluting. In contrast, in the tax 
solution, the enforcement of the tax leaves polluting organizations worse off than they 
were. While enforcement is not likely to be perfect in either case, we would expect 
enforcement to be better for the subsidy case if the polluting organizations are 
powerful. The downside of the subsidy strategy is that the government loses revenue, 
instead of gaining revenue with a tax strategy. In addition, considerations of justice 
may politically prevent subsidies being offered to polluters, but if the polluters also 
happen to be relatively poor, welfare considerations could support a subsidy strategy. 
The general point is that apart from fiscal, justice and other considerations, the 
alternative policy solutions need to be compared purely in terms of the enforceability 
of the conditions required to achieve the desired outcomes. Given the distribution of 
power across organizations described by the political settlement, this comparison 
could help to identify the policy solution that is most likely to be effective in 
enhancing net social benefits. 
 
The general proposition that follows from this discussion is that there are typically 
several policies that could address any particular contracting failure and an important 
policy question is to select the best policy for that context. Policy choices can be 
motivated by many considerations, for instance, fiscal consequences or distributive 
justice, and to some extent policy choices are themselves driven by rent-seeking 
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activities of organizations. However, an important consideration for policy-makers is 
to check that the requirements for successful policy outcomes (the required rent 
allocation conditions shown in Figure 1) can be plausibly approximated given the 
political settlement. The relative power of organizations is difficult to influence as this 
reflects the political settlement describing macro-social characteristics of that society. 
The political settlement can and does change over time but it is not an immediate 
policy variable under most circumstances. Normally, the current political settlement is 
an exogenous variable that may not be amenable to policy choices. This simply means 
that selecting the policy that is most likely to work in that context is very important 
for ensuring the best possible policy outcomes.  
 
3. Technology Policies for Accelerating Learning  
The contracting failures affecting pollution are relatively simple compared to the 
contracting failures that can affect technology acquisition. As discussed earlier, there 
are potentially several different types of contracting failures affecting technology 
acquisition, and the first task is to identify the most important ones affecting particular 
countries or sectors. We will illustrate the general argument with reference to a 
particular contracting failure affecting technology acquisition: the problem of 
financing the learning-by-doing necessary for achieving competitiveness with new 
technologies (Khan 2013). In developing countries, while domestic innovations may 
play a role, the main problem of technology acquisition is ‘learning’ the use of 
existing technologies and building the organizational capabilities for competitively 
using these technologies. Developing countries find it difficult to set up productive 
economic organizations even if they can buy the appropriate machines and have low 
wages for workers with the appropriate formal skills. Learning refers to processes of 
learning-by-doing required for building the relevant organizational capabilities so that 
economic organizations can become competitive in using these technologies and 
implicit or explicit subsidies are no longer required for these operations.  
 
The core problem of achieving competitiveness with new technologies is that 
competitiveness is determined not only by domestic factor prices but primarily by the 
productivity of labour, inputs and of the capital stock of domestic economic 
organizations using these technologies. These productivities depend largely on the 
organizational setup of the firm and not just on the quality and vintage of its capital 
stock and the formal skills of its workforce. The firm as an economic organization has 
to continue to experiment and adapt its internal organizational structures to reduce 
costs and improve a range of vital input-output ratios. The processes in question 
include setting up the machines and processes in the workplace to achieve the fastest 
throughput of production, setting up internal processes to minimize input wastage, 
processes to minimize the rate of rejection of final products, to minimize inventories 
without losing production time due to bottlenecks, maximize orders without missing 
delivery deadlines, managing customer services and after sales support and so on. 
These vital processes are much more important and more difficult to learn than the 
operation of individual pieces of machinery. The knowledge in question is also tacit 
knowledge that can only be acquired through learning-by-doing processes and not 
from manuals or classes, though these can provide some threshold level of 
knowledge. Moreover, the most effective organizational design for using the same 
technology may also vary across countries, because organizations have to respond to 
and find solutions to differences in work patterns, infrastructural constraints, external 
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supply and support systems and so on. Thus, hiring supervisors with experience in 
foreign factories can reduce the learning time, but organizational innovation is still 
necessary because the organizational design of a foreign factory will in most cases not 
achieve the competitiveness that is required.  
 
The challenge for technology acquisition is therefore to adapt the design of 
organizations, their internal hierarchy structures, incentive systems, monitoring 
systems and so on, till competitiveness is achieved. If the development of 
organizational capability fails, the plant continues to produce at a higher cost or 
produces products of a lower quality. This can be sustained for a time using market 
protection and subsidies of different types but subsidies cannot be sustained forever. 
Moreover, if organizational capability does not develop, the subsidies required to 
survive are likely to grow as plants in other countries become even more productive. 
Thus, the failure to develop productive organizational capabilities is likely to result in 
a failure of the technology acquisition strategy as a whole. The organizational 
learning problem has two closely related dimensions. First, during the period of 
learning the organization is not yet competitive and its low or negative profits have to 
be financed. Secondly, the financing has to be on terms such that the stakeholders 
within the firm put in high levels of effort in the learning process to rapidly achieve 
competitiveness. In principle, the loss-making period of learning-by-doing can be 
financed with injections of private funds, provided the contracts between financiers 
and firms create sufficient compulsions on the firm to use the learning space to 
rapidly raise productivity and product quality. The ‘doing’ is necessary for ‘learning’, 
but on its own the doing is not sufficient to ensure learning. This is unfortunately 
demonstrated by the many instances of ‘infant industries’ in developing countries that 
failed to become competitive after years of subsidies financing learning-by-doing.  
 
The important question is why private contracting fails to organize investments in 
high-effort learning, particularly since all the stakeholders in the firm stand to gain. 
Several variants of contracting failures can be relevant, and it is important to identify 
the most plausible ones. One possibility is an appropriability problem. Here the 
assumption is that a first-mover firm may have an incentive to invest in learning to 
create a competitive organization because low wages in the country offers the 
possibility of earning higher-than-normal profits once productivity improves. The 
appropriability problem is that some of their supervisors and managers can leave with 
their tacit knowledge to set up competing firms. If these competing firms reduce the 
profits of the first mover down to the normal level, that can dissuade investments in 
learning. This is a theoretically plausible argument except that privately financed 
learning fails to emerge just as frequently in industries and sectors that do not have 
the characteristics that would make them subject to this type of appropriability 
problem. For instance, private investments in learning are rare even in sectors with 
considerable market power or entry barriers, like automobiles or iron and steel in 
countries which have the formal skills to contemplate these sectors. In addition, at the 
other end of the scale, there are many sectors like low technology garments in labour 
surplus countries, where entry does not have any plausible threat of raising wages or 
global input prices and both first movers and their followers can expect low profit 
margins to begin with. Here too the fear of entry is unlikely to deter the first mover. 
On the contrary, in many such industries, including electronic components and light 
engineering, the first mover may positively welcome new entrants so that clustering 
happens and foreign buyers are attracted to set up their buying houses. So while the 
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appropriability problem for first movers may affect investments in learning in some 
sectors, it is not likely to be the general problem  
 
If first mover fears of losing profits were the relevant problem, this could be 
addressed with short-term subsidies for new start-ups. With a temporary subsidy for 
the learning period, the first mover would not have to finance the development of 
organizational structures on the expectation of high future profits. In that case, even if 
imitation was expected to reduce profits to the normal level relatively quickly, the 
first mover would still earn normal profits like anyone else. However, if investments 
in learning are not happening even in sectors where entry does not pose compelling 
risks to future profitability, some other type of contracting failure may be relevant. 
Indeed, we know that subsidizing the loss-making period is not sufficient for ensuring 
the achievement of competitiveness because many firms and industries never become 
competitive even after years of external support. This suggests other contracting 
failures may be at play. Private financiers may not have any credible way of ensuring 
that when they finance a firm’s loss-making period, decision-makers within the firm 
will be compelled to put in high levels of effort in the learning process so that 
competitiveness is rapidly achieved. What type of contract would ensure this?  
 
When a developing country acquires existing technologies, its firms cannot hope for 
very high profits in the future, irrespective of the level of domestic entry. The 
technologies are typically mature, there are countries with higher wages producing 
these products (but with even higher productivity levels they are more competitive), 
and many lower wage countries could potentially enter later. The expectation of 
above normal profits cannot be the main incentive for domestic producers attempting 
to enter these markets, and this is the main reason why focusing on the appropriability 
problem may be misleading. In the general case, the firm that is successful in 
organizing learning can at best look forward to normal profits in a harshly competitive 
world. The prize, in other words, is not very attractive, and certainly in the general 
case does not offer the promise of significant or long-lasting rents. Yet learning 
happens in some of these ‘normal-profit’ sectors with no promise of above-normal 
profits for first movers, and learning often fails in many sectors despite long-lasting 
learning rents being allocated to first movers in the form of protected markets and 
subsidies. The answer to this puzzle must be that normal profits can be incentive 
enough for many types of learning and the availability of rents on their own is 
insufficient to ensure successful learning-by-doing. The deeper problem is likely to be 
one of ensuring high levels of effort in the process of learning within the production 
team. This is particularly likely to be a problem if the learning is financed by 
financiers who are not in control of the learning process within the firm.  
 
Consider the simplest case of a firm owned by a single individual who is also the 
manager. This allows us to ignore the principal-agent problems between owners and 
managers within the firm. The problem we focus on is that the typical owner is 
unlikely to have the resources or the risk appetite to finance the entire process of 
technology acquisition and learning without external financing. The external financier 
on the other hand has little control over the effort that insiders put into the learning 
process. Neither side can accurately predict how long it will take the firm to become 
profitable. Finally, the firm is unlikely to make high profits even when it does become 
profitable. It follows that in the typical case, it is hard to find a contract acceptable to 
both sides which provides adequate financing for learning and yet creates strong 
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compulsions for putting in high levels of effort. If effort could be easily observed, 
contracting would be easier. The financier could repeatedly check progress and stick 
it out despite temporary problems if there was a prospect of a resolution soon. 
Without this, the financier is likely to demand contracts with exit clauses that allow it 
to withdraw investments at a later stage if progress is perceived to be slow, but the 
firm will reject most such contracts if it thinks its effort can go to waste at a later stage 
because it could not persuade the financier to stick it out for a little longer. Only a 
relatively complex contract would be acceptable to both sides under these 
circumstances, but the more complex the contract, the more unlikely that it can be 
enforced in the typical developing country.  
 
Fixed interest financing will probably not be acceptable to the firm because it exposes 
it to too much risk. A viable firm engaging in technology acquisition may easily go 
bankrupt with a fixed interest loan if there were relatively small delays in achieving 
competitiveness. An ex post profit-sharing contract may be acceptable to the firm if 
the terms were right. But in most cases profit-sharing may be unacceptable for the 
external financier given the tight limits that have to be set on the learning period for 
the financing to be viable. It is possible to imagine contingency contracts that may be 
acceptable to both sides, for instance, setting clearly defined milestones which could 
be used to trigger credible exit strategies for the financier enabling at least a part of 
the investment to be withdrawn under different contingencies. This would reduce the 
risk for the financier and also increase the compulsion on the firm to put in high levels 
of effort. However, given the weak contract enforcement conditions in most 
developing countries, plus the uncertainties of evaluating intermediate learning 
outcomes (for the financier) and of predicting achievable levels of progress in 
learning in advance (for the firm), it is not surprising that contingency contracts for 
financing learning are not often observed in practice.  
 
The technical problem that private contracting can fail to address is summarized in 
Figure 2. The vertical axis measures the competitiveness of the domestic firm for a 
product of a specific quality that it intends to produce after acquiring a technology 
new to the firm and new to the country. Competitiveness is measured by 𝑃  𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙
𝐶𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
 
where Pglobal is the global market price of a product of that quality and Cdomestic is the 
domestic cost of production. The domestic firm becomes competitive only when the 
competitiveness index becomes greater than 1.  At time t = 1 when the firm plans to 
acquire its technology, its low productivity of labour and input usage and possibly 
also low levels of capacity utilization and capital productivity means that its 
competitiveness index at point X is far below that required for market viability. For 
the firm to be able to begin a learning-by-doing process of capability development, 
the implicit gap in competitiveness has to be covered with loss financing shown in 
Figure 2 by the gap sQ. The contracting problem is that this financing has to be 
provided by financiers external to the firm on contractual terms acceptable to all 
parties. If the firm puts in high levels of effort in experimentation and adaptation of its 
internal organizational routines, the high effort path can lead it to competitiveness by 
time t = n. If on the other hand the firm puts in low levels of effort in learning, it may 
never achieve competitiveness (or achieve it too late for the financing to be 
profitable). The financier cannot predict the firm’s level of effort in advance, and may 
even be unable to discern the effort trajectory while organizational capability is being 
developed. Given the narrow profit margins in most cases and the sensitivity of the 
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returns to the breakeven period, it is not surprising that left to their own devices, 
financiers with money and firms with potentially good management structures fail to 
contract to finance the learning required for technology acquisition. 
 
 
 
Source: Khan (2013: Figure 2) 
Figure 2 Effort Levels and the Viability of the Learning Process  
 
Public policies for technology acquisition in developing countries have responded to 
this and other contracting failures. One component of most technology acquisition 
strategies is that states directly or indirectly provide the financing sQ required for the 
learning-by-doing to commence. When public policy does this, it effectively provides 
a ‘learning rent’ to the firm. However, as in the case of private financing, the learning 
rent is only likely to succeed if by design or accident, the policies create not only 
opportunities but also compulsions for firms to raise their competitiveness by putting 
in a high level of effort in the development of organizational capabilities. Without a 
set of credible conditions on the allocation and withdrawal of subsidies (the rent 
allocation and management conditions), the outcome is typically a low effort learning 
strategy on the part of firms, and competitiveness is often never achieved. Thus, with 
public financing, a different set of incentives and enforcement capabilities come into 
play, but the underlying problem remains very similar. On the one hand, the state has 
a wider range of financing instruments and associated enforcement tools than the ones 
available to private financiers. On the other hand, public financing and policy-induced 
rents are subject to the rent seeking activities of powerful economic organizations that 
now have the incentive to spend time and resources to ‘politically’ protect their rents. 
We know that some countries have managed to achieve dramatic outcomes through 
public technology acquisition strategies while others have not. Our contention is that 
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by understanding the different components of this problem and designing policies that 
are likely to work better in the context of specific political settlements, the probability 
of success can be improved. In any case, the alternative route of attempting to 
encourage private contracting to finance learning is likely to be even more difficult 
given the governance environments in most developing countries and the economic 
characteristics of the learning process.  
 
The apparently short-sighted rent protection strategies of firms receiving learning 
rents can be better understood if we keep in mind the limited prize that is available by 
achieving competitiveness. The social benefit to a country of developing national 
organizational capabilities can be large because of spillovers and clustering effects. 
However, for the individual firm receiving a learning rent, there is often a strong 
incentive compatibility problem in putting in high levels of effort to achieve 
competitiveness. The firm is very likely already receiving enough rents through the 
policy mechanism to achieve a normal rate of return for the key stakeholders. Its prize 
for achieving a higher level of organizational capability is that it will lose its learning 
rent and instead earn a similar normal profit through the tougher route of production 
in an uncertain and harsh market environment. Given this adverse incentive, it is not 
surprising that firms will often use their ingenuity and effort in rent-seeking activities 
to prolong the period of support or to postpone the withdrawal conditions. The result 
is ‘satisficing’ behaviour by many firms receiving support for learning, where 
management and key stakeholders within the firm are happy to continue business as 
usual and exert most of their creative effort in ensuring that the status quo continues. 
Of course, in the long run this is not a sustainable strategy, but the long run rarely 
constrains economic decisions. Successful catching-up strategies have to rely on more 
than the natural incentives of managers, owners and other stakeholders to grab the 
opportunity provided by the rent to try and achieve long-run competitiveness. High-
effort learning strategies require effective short to medium-term compulsions on 
decision-makers in firms to direct their time and effort into developing productive 
organizational capabilities. This involves some combination of measures to block 
unproductive rent-seeking activities and imposing conditions on the allocation of rents 
to compel high levels of effort in learning. This is precisely why the interface shown 
in Figure 1 between the rent allocation conditions required for the success of a policy 
and the rent seeking strategies of the relevant organizations is so important.  
 
4. Institutional Problems of Ensuring Effort in Learning  
The interface between the rent allocation requirement of particular policies and the 
rent-seeking strategies of organizations is not simple because the outcome depends on 
non-linear interactions between several variables. The underlying enforcement 
success or failure has elements that are similar to principal-agent problems that can 
result in breakdowns in team effort or in the operation of credit markets (Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). However, here 
broader political economy issues are relevant because the state is allocating rents and 
the political ability or otherwise of the state to enforce credible conditions for effort 
becomes salient. This raises issues that go beyond asymmetric information. Rent 
seeking is now based on the mobilization of organizational and political power and 
can determine the likelihood of capturing or protecting particular rents without any 
asymmetric information. In particular, the political power and links of economic 
organizations and their organizational capabilities can affect the possibility of 
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enforcing effort-inducing conditions on the allocation of particular incremental rents. 
The problem is that the effect of a rent allocation policy depends not just on the 
details of the formal rent allocation instrument, but also on its appropriateness for 
solving the learning problems of firms, on the capabilities of the agencies enforcing it 
and the political settlement that describes the relative power of the organizations 
involved. The effect on effort is the outcome of an interaction between these variables 
that determines the actual conditions of rent allocation and withdrawal, and these 
determine the real incentives and compulsions of firms to put their effort into 
productive capability development or unproductive rent maintenance activities. The 
critical ‘variables’ that determine the level of effort firms put into the learning 
exercise to raise their productive capabilities are listed in eq. [1]:  
 
),,,( PSFSGAFIfe =  [1] 
Effort e is defined as the intensity with which organizational learning through 
experimentation is being carried out, to raise firm-level productivity. The higher the 
level of effort, the steeper the convergence to global competitiveness levels in Figure 
2. FI describes the specific financing instrument through which the learning rent is 
delivered. This is broadly defined as any policy instrument that directly or indirectly 
allocates rents to firms with a possible effect on their learning strategies. The 
financing instrument is the immediate policy variable that formally defines how the 
rent should be allocated and defines the formal terms and conditions for withdrawal 
and the formal responsibilities of the different parties. The formal allocative rules 
defined by the financing instrument FI may of course not correspond very closely to 
the actual allocation and management of rents, which may happen largely in response 
to political pressures and mobilizations, often operating informally. These informal 
modifications are hugely important and their nature and extent depends on the 
interaction of the financing instrument with other variables in the function. GA 
describes the capabilities of the governance agencies that monitor and enforce the 
conditions implicit in the operation of the financing instrument. The enforcement of 
the formal rules implicit in each instrument can vary widely depending on the 
enforcement capabilities of the agencies responsible. FS describes features of the firm 
structure, referring to characteristics of the firm(s) being supported that are relevant 
including size, initial productive capabilities, political links and the type of markets 
(competitive or otherwise) in which they operate. PS is the political settlement which 
describes the relative bargaining power of the different types of organizations affected 
by the operation of the policy. The function f is not a differentiable mathematical 
function, and the variables in this function are unlikely to have additively separable 
effects. Rather, each of the variables has an effect whose magnitude and even sign can 
depend on the values of the other variables. This non-linear interdependence makes 
the political economy of industrial policy particularly interesting.  
 
Financing Instruments 
In the industrial policy strategies of many developing countries in the 1960s and 
1970s, very significant learning rents were typically allocated to broadly defined 
sectors. The financing instruments used included tariff protection to raise domestic 
prices of particular products thereby providing rents to domestic firms in protected 
sectors, export subsidies, tax breaks, low interest credit, often from state-owned 
development banks and subsidized input prices, including utilities and infrastructure. 
There are important differences in the details of the design of each of these 
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instruments from country to country. However, the general feature of these policies 
was that a significant portion of these rents were allocated ex ante, that is before the 
firm had established competitive capabilities, and the rents were significant in their 
scope (in terms of the numbers of sectors and firms supported). A common feature of 
these policy choices was that the formal pattern of rent allocation, combined with the 
distribution of power in the political settlement, created strong incentives for recipient 
firms to spend time and effort in rent-seeking activities to protect the rents once they 
had been allocated. Very few developing country states had the political capability to 
enforce the formal conditions on rent allocation that would compel high levels of 
effort, such as making the rents time dependent or their allocation conditional on 
performance. In many cases states did not even try to formally define rent allocation 
conditions, while in the few successful industrial policy states, early successes in 
attempts at rent allocation resulted in greater formalization of conditions over time.  
 
This was not just an oversight in the less successful industrial policy states. No 
country began its technology acquisition policies with a complete map of what needed 
to be done. In the successful countries, trial and error in policy formulation resulted in 
formal financing instruments moving in the direction of better-defined formal 
conditions precisely because productivity-enhancing rent allocations were successful. 
The political and bureaucratic elites in many developing countries where industrial 
policy was performing poorly were perfectly aware of the problem at a very early 
stage but in these countries formal policy did not evolve in the direction of greater 
effectiveness, precisely because the relevant agencies knew that movements in that 
direction would not be enforceable. For instance, in India, the Dutt Committee 
recognized by the mid-1960s that the licensing regime that was directing rents to 
infant industries was primarily helping a small group of large firms who were 
capturing these rents on their own terms (Government of India 1969). But the politics 
of responding to this effectively was not simple. To the extent that responses were 
attempted, they were often blunt and counterproductive. Thus, in India, one response 
was Indira Gandhi’s Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP) of 1969 
which set asset limits on the holdings of large business houses that were thought to 
have unduly prospered under the licensing regime. The new act was largely punitive, 
was not properly enforced and had little effect on actual levels of concentration. 
Significantly, it did not seek to address the problem of rent management to achieve 
better outcomes. The state did not try to set new conditions for achieving 
competitiveness by changing the broad contours of the policy, including the choice of 
supported sectors and firms, even though the necessity of such changes was explicitly 
recognized by the Dutt Committee.  
 
In other words, the failure to move in the direction of better rent management, at least 
in India in the 1960s, cannot be attributed to ignorance. However, there may have 
been missed opportunities of a more complex sort. The problem was that the current 
financing instruments allocating learning rents were giving significant ex ante rents to 
broadly defined sectors and it was difficult to exclude large business houses from 
these rents. Enforcing effective conditions on this financing instrument was clearly 
beyond the capabilities of the Indian state of the time given the political settlement 
and it did not attempt to move in that direction. However, other financing instruments 
may have been more successful and some insights into what may have worked 
became clearer with the experiences of the 1980s. But thinking through to those 
options would require a much more open and interactive analytical framework 
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incorporating the effects of the political settlement in assessing policy options. Only 
in this sense were opportunities of policy reform missed at that time.  
 
Similarly, widespread public disapproval of state supported accumulation and 
technology strategies emerged in Pakistan in the late 1960s as a result of the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of Pakistan’s ‘twenty-two families’. The weak 
control over the rent management process led not only to a very high level of wealth 
concentration, many of the industries that were emerging were not approaching global 
competitiveness and had the character of industries protected for cronies. Some real 
capabilities were undoubtedly developed, but the failure of any significant sector to 
reach global competitiveness undermined the political support for these strategies. 
The result was widespread nationalizations in Pakistan and the newly created 
Bangladesh in the early 1970s under Bhutto and Mujib respectively. The nationalized 
industries were even closer to political power and therefore even more able to distort 
rent allocation and less likely to put in high levels of effort in learning. This was the 
prelude to the abandonment of learning strategies and the transition to liberalization.   
 
The types of formal financing instruments used by states are an important determinant 
of the incentives and compulsions facing firms not only because the formal rent 
allocations are different, but also because the informal modifications through rent 
seeking and resistance may be different because different types of organizations are 
selected or self-select themselves given the incentives. For instance, monitoring 
requirements are very different depending on whether the learning rents are available 
‘ex ante’ (before success is established) or promised ‘ex post’ (after success is 
established). The typical patent based Schumpeterian rent that creates incentives for 
innovation is usually available to successful innovators ex post. For rents allocated ex 
post, the public monitoring requirements are less demanding and the institutional 
requirement is mainly to determine the period of ex post rent protection, which 
primarily determines the magnitude of the prize allocated to the successful innovators 
(Khan 2000a). Even if rents are only available as ex post prizes, they can still help to 
make the financing of innovation more viable, because innovators can now offer risk-
taking investors higher returns in the future, thereby getting access to longer periods 
of low-interest or zero-interest financing. However, some Schumpeterian rents may 
also be allocated ex ante by public policy, for instance as subsidies to universities or 
to industries in the form of innovation grants. These ex ante rents require much closer 
monitoring to ensure progress is being made at different stages of the innovation cycle 
so that support can be withdrawn and losses minimized if progress is unsatisfactory.  
 
In contrast to Schumpeterian rents, learning rents are typically provided ex ante (for 
instance through tariffs on imports or the provision of low cost credit). Unfortunately, 
large programmes granting significant learning rents ex ante have been associated 
with low effort in learning in many cases. There are exceptions in countries where the 
political settlement allowed the state to monitor, manage and withdraw rents from 
significant economic organizations. Most developing countries did not have state 
organizations or political settlements that had these characteristics, and as a result 
these types of financing instruments performed poorly. However, there have been 
interesting cases of successful technology adoption in countries that did not do well 
with ex ante financing instruments. In the cases of success, the financing often 
involved the allocation of a significant part of the rent ex post, after substantial 
success in learning had been established. If the financing instrument allocated some of 
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the rent ex ante but reserved significant rents as a prize ex post, conditional on the 
achievement of competitive success, these conditions could help to self-select firms 
that believed they could make the productivity jump as well as creating strong 
compulsions and incentives for high levels of effort in learning. In addition, if the 
delivery of the ex post rents was sufficiently large and credible, firms engaged in 
learning could also raise financing on viable terms from investors in the same way as 
innovators aiming for Schumpeterian rents can raise money for financing innovations.  
 
In the 1980s a number of sectors in South Asian countries made significant progress 
in technology adoption and in developing organizational capabilities for competitive 
production. Far from being associated with liberalization, many of these successes 
were associated with new types of policy-induced rents and rent allocation 
mechanisms that worked much better. The interesting feature of the new policy 
environment was that the old financing instruments based on large-scale ex ante 
financing were gradually phased out and new forms of support emerged, many of 
which provided a significant part of the learning rent as a prize for success ex post and 
targeted rents to more narrowly defined sectors or even to individual firms.  
 
Examples include the rents offered by the Indian state to Suzuki to participate in the 
Suzuki-Maruti joint venture agreement signed in 1982. Most of the learning rent in 
this case was accessible ex post in the form of access to the protected Indian 
automobile market which still had tariffs in the region of 85 per cent. But to be able to 
sell in this protected market, Suzuki first had to make the Maruti-Suzuki car and it had 
to make it with 60 per cent domestic content within five years. This meant Suzuki had 
to make a significant investment in improving the organizational capabilities of Indian 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 component producers to meet the domestic content target and yet 
produce a car that would be of higher quality than existing Indian cars like the 
Ambassador. There were additional reasons for not compromising on quality, 
including the reputation risk for the global Suzuki brand. The design of the financing 
here clearly created strong incentives and compulsions for effort because Suzuki had 
no interest in drawing the process out and every interest in completing it quickly. 
Moreover, there was a very strong likelihood that without fulfilling the domestic 
content requirement the company could be excluded from the ex post rent. Exclusion 
from the domestic market for contract violation was a condition that could be 
plausibly enforced on a single foreign company with no domestic political alliances 
given India’s governance capabilities and political settlement at the time. Not 
surprisingly, the result was a very successful transfer of organizational capabilities, 
with the rapid development of a broad group of component manufacturers who later 
became the foundation of a globally competitive Indian automobile industry.  
 
Another example was the garment industry takeoff in Bangladesh in the 1980s which 
was based on the MFA (Multi-Fiber Arrangement) providing ex post rents to 
producers in Bangladesh provided they achieved sufficient competitiveness to begin 
to export. The MFA restricted imports into the USA from established garments 
exporters and this enabled quota-free countries like Bangladesh to temporarily enjoy 
rents in these markets as a result of the slightly higher prices at which they could sell. 
This was an ex post rent because the prize could only be captured by firms that had 
already developed enough organizational capabilities to be able to export. The 
availability of the prize enabled the first garments firms in Bangladesh to raise money 
for investing in capability development. Here too there were interesting innovations, 
21 
 
including an on-the-job training programme for managers from the Bangladeshi 
company Desh that was conducted in the South Korean plant of Daewoo. Daewoo 
undertook to host the Bangladeshis at its own expense, to be repaid by the 
Bangladeshi company with a percentage of its sales revenue. This financing 
arrangement for transferring organizational capabilities created strong compulsions on 
both sides to put in high levels of effort as the costs of all parties went up with a low-
effort strategy. The result was a very successful transfer of organizational capabilities. 
Desh became the pioneer of the garments industry in Bangladesh, and contrary to the 
first-mover disincentive story, it encouraged and allowed its managers to leave and set 
up new garments firms so that clustering could rapidly happen. Both these examples 
are discussed in greater detail in Khan (2013). 
 
The general point to be made here is that while the traditional financing instruments 
providing ex ante rents did not work in South Asia, the experience of the 1980s shows 
that other types of financing instruments did work in successfully financing the 
development of new organizational capabilities. These capabilities in turn allowed the 
transfer and adaptation of technologies new to these countries. Indeed both the 
automobile sector in India and the garments and textile sector in Bangladesh played 
an important role in driving economic growth in these countries for more than three 
decades since the 1980s.  
 
Governance Agencies 
Governance agencies are the bureaucracies within the state that are charged with the 
management of policies including the allocation of the relevant rents. The formal 
technical capabilities of these agencies to monitor and enforce these allocations 
clearly matter. Relevant agencies may include central banks, development banks, 
fiscal agencies and planning commissions charged with monitoring and implementing 
the allocation of rents associated with particular programmes. However, the actual 
power of governance agencies depends not just on their technical capabilities and 
training but also on the political settlement of which they are a part. Governance 
agencies are organizations and the relative power of these organizations relative to 
others is an important aspect of the political settlement. The technical capabilities of 
governance agencies (described in this variable) and the relative power of these 
organizations relative to others (as described in the political settlement variable) 
jointly determine the ability of governance agencies to enforce particular sets of rent 
allocation conditions.  
 
The governance agency that is relevant depends on the financing instrument. For 
instance, if rents are allocated to firms in the form of cheap credit from industrial 
banks, the relevant governance agencies are the managements of the banks and the 
agencies the banks in turn rely on for the enforcement of their contracts (like 
bankruptcy courts). Do these agencies collectively have the capability to monitor 
loans effectively; do they have the power to withdraw loans if firms are failing to 
adhere to agreed conditions? Similarly, if rents are allocated in the form of subsidies, 
the relevant governance agencies are the ones responsible for administering the 
subsidies. Do they have the technical capabilities for monitoring performance and 
withdrawing the subsidies if necessary?  
 
Technical capabilities alone clearly do not ensure that enforcement will be effective. 
The distribution of power across organizations in the political settlement and the types 
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of rents that are being allocated through the financing instrument jointly determine the 
degree of enforcement that is achieved. The same governance agencies may be quite 
effective in enforcing a rent allocation that involves imposing conditions on relatively 
weak organizations but may fail when enforcing a slightly different policy that 
requires them to discipline organizations that happen to be powerful within the current 
political settlement. For instance, a policy of granting temporary export subsidies to 
firms using new technologies could create compulsions for high levels of effort if the 
affected firms had no means of prolonging these subsidies but not if they had the 
political ability to override the time limits using their political alliances. Industrial 
development banks are likely to have higher levels of credibility for enforcing threats 
of capital withdrawal from failing firms if the firms do not have powerful political 
allies and the bank is supported by a strong president rather than if the bank is 
operating in a context of divided political authority where powerful political factions 
can prevent the enforcement of discipline on their client business houses. The 
contribution of the governance agency to the achievement of a high-effort outcome 
therefore depends not just on the technical competence of the relevant agency but also 
on the financing instrument that defines the distribution of rents and the political 
settlement that defines the relative power of the affected organizations: another 
example of the non-linear interaction between these variables.  
 
Firm Structure 
The outcome of a particular policy framework also depends on the characteristics of 
the firms that are benefiting from a learning strategy. A number of features of the 
firms targeted by policy may be relevant. What is their initial productive capability, 
how are they connected to different types of political organizations, how does this 
affect their bargaining power to protect rents, what kind of markets do they operate in 
and are there competitive pressures coming from these markets to raise their 
productivity? These and other features of the firm structure can affect the ‘fit’ 
between the expected outcomes of a formal rent allocation policy and its actual 
outcome in terms of the effort put in by firms in raising productive capabilities. Once 
again, there are many non-linear interactions to be aware of that can produce 
unexpected outcomes if we are not careful.   
 
The productive capabilities of firms can have two contradictory effects on their rent 
capture strategies. First, more productive firms have more resources to invest in rent-
seeking activities. This increases the likelihood that these firms will be more able to 
protect any incremental rents they get. On the other hand, productive firms that are 
already close to the competitiveness frontier may find that putting their effort into 
becoming competitive may be a safer and more viable strategy than focusing on rent 
protection alone. In contrast, for firms that are far away from the competitiveness 
frontier, high effort in developing the appropriate organizational capabilities only 
makes sense if they can be assured of long-run support for learning and if the easier 
strategies of rent protection are ruled out by effective limits on their rent-seeking 
activities. By definition, most firms in developing countries initially do not have high 
levels of technological and organizational capabilities (this is why the country is still 
developing). Most firms still have to learn how to learn before they actually start 
learning (Stiglitz 1987). This creates adverse incentives for many firms to invest in 
political connections because if they had to rely solely on their productive capabilities 
they would be very vulnerable. Older or larger firms, particularly when they are not 
very productive are more likely to be well-connected to political organizations and 
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their prosperity is likely to be dependent on these connections. Consequently it may 
be difficult to discipline such firms in a context where significant learning rents are 
being provided by the state. One of the advantages of financing mechanisms that 
provide significant ex post rents is that this induces a degree of self-selection in the 
firms taking up these schemes. A firm that has little chance of becoming competitive 
in a new technology is unlikely to participate in a scheme that requires it to invest up-
front in organizational capabilities based on the promise of significant ex post rents.  
 
The political connections and networks of firms are very important for explaining 
their bargaining power in protecting their rents or subverting conditions attached to 
these rents, but these connections cannot be read off from their economic 
characteristics. This is why we need independent data on the overall political 
settlement which describes the relative power of different types of organizations. The 
political settlement variable has an interactive effect in determining why apparently 
similar types of firms may respond differently to similar types of financing 
instruments. For instance, the modern manufacturing sector in both Pakistan and 
South Korea in the 1960s was dominated by a small number of large diversified 
holding companies that each included plants in different manufacturing sectors. In 
both countries, public policy provided learning rents to these conglomerates to acquire 
new technologies and move into exports through similar financing instruments like 
domestic market protection, subsidized credit, and export subsidies. However, high 
levels of effort could not be achieved for firms of this type in Pakistan but were 
achieved in South Korea. To a significant extent this was because large conglomerates 
in Pakistan acquired the political capacity to protect their rents from threats of 
withdrawal in a way that South Korean chaebols could not. To understand this we 
need to look at the relationships between the firm structure and political organizations 
within the context of a political settlement. In Pakistan, there were many political sub-
organizations that were not under the centralized control of the ruling coalition, 
despite the ruling coalition being a military-led government in the 1960s, just as in 
South Korea. Behind the formal structure of a unified ruling coalition, the Pakistani 
political settlement described a distribution of organizational power that was 
significantly fragmented. Many political and bureaucratic organizations were 
independently powerful and they could deploy their power to benefit themselves 
independently of the wishes of the President.  
 
The consequence was that firms in Pakistan that wanted to protect their rents could 
easily make arrangements to share rents with one or more of these political or 
bureaucratic sub-organizations. This involved kicking back some of their subsidies to 
these lower-level organizations and in exchange the latter would assist by effectively 
protecting their rents. This arrangement benefited the firm and their allied political 
and bureaucratic organizations but adversely affected the overall industrial strategy 
and the net social benefits of the country. The interface between the firm structure and 
the specific political settlement meant that financing instruments that provided a 
significant part of the rents ex ante could not be effectively disciplined in Pakistan. 
Not so in South Korea. The large chaebol were the descendants of Japanese 
companies and after the defeat and departure of Japan, these companies enjoyed little 
popular sympathy or support. Moreover, even if the chaebol had some legitimacy, 
they would have found it very difficult to make similar political connections. The 
ruling coalition in South Korea was differently structured, and could impose its 
authority on its own lower levels. Political organizations outside the ruling coalition 
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had very limited power to protect the rents of firms. This meant that firms receiving 
rents would have to satisfy the calculations of the highest authorities to retain their 
rents. The highest authorities had no incentive to tolerate rent capture by 
organizations that were not enhancing productivity. This is because a secure ruling 
coalition that could take a view over several years would always find more productive 
organizations more attractive to support because the latter could provide greater 
benefits over time, whether legally in the form of taxes or illegally in the form of 
kickbacks. The threat of rent withdrawal from low-effort firms was therefore credible 
in South Korea and because it was credible, this threat rarely had to be used. High 
levels of organizational effort were always forthcoming (Khan 1999).  
 
Although Taiwan is often loosely included in the ‘East Asian’ model, its firm 
structure and financing instruments were quite different from South Korea in the 
1960s and 1970s. In Taiwan, financing instruments allocated rents to much smaller 
firms and once we look at Taiwan’s political settlement, it is possible that a strategy 
of building up very large conglomerates may have failed at that time. The 
Kuomintang (KMT) was a foreign political force in Taiwan, having been forced there 
after their defeat in mainland China at the hands of Mao’s forces in 1949. Given its 
external origins, the KMT was clearly unwilling to allow domestic economic 
conglomerates to become too big because they may well have used their economic 
power to challenge the political authority of the outsiders. In any case, large 
Taiwanese conglomerates may have been difficult to discipline in this political 
settlement. Fortunately for Taiwan, the financing instruments used by the government 
in its strategies of technology acquisition focused on smaller firms in high technology 
sectors. These firms had sufficient organizational capabilities to be interested in 
investing in productive capacity development, but were politically unable to link up 
with sub-organizations within the KMT or to challenge its authority entirely. As a 
result, the Taiwanese state’s ability to enforce discipline in the form of conditions on 
its rent allocation decisions was not impaired. The interesting counterfactual is 
whether countries like Pakistan and India may have fared better if they had designed 
support schemes for smaller firms who may have found it more difficult to capture 
policy in the way in which the ‘twenty-two families’ of Pakistan or the big business 
houses of India did (Wade 1988; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Whitley 1992; Khan 
1999; Khan and Blankenburg 2009).  
 
The pressure on firms to invest in productivity growth is likely to be enhanced if some 
part of their activity is in competitive markets. Firms that are exporting, even with 
subsidies, will soon find that without productivity growth, the existing level of 
subsidy will be insufficient for their continued survival. In contrast firms producing 
for protected domestic markets or with considerable market power may ignore 
productivity growth for much longer. This is yet another reason why countries with 
political settlements where large established firms have many links with political 
organizations should focus their financing on smaller firms operating in more 
competitive markets. Apart from the greater difficulty such firms may find in 
establishing political linkages, their market operations can add to their compulsions 
for enhancing organizational capabilities. Market competition is not enough on its 
own, because learning still requires rents and the rents dampen competitive pressures 
for a while. This is precisely because at existing market prices these firms could not 
enter production at all given their current capabilities. But some market exposure can 
reduce the challenges of monitoring and enforcing conditions to compel high levels of 
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effort. Of course, for some products, scale economies mean that a small-firm strategy 
is implausible. In these cases, policy design has to be aware of the difficulties of 
disciplining large well-connected firms. Compensatory measures to prioritize the 
strengthening of governance agencies may be a partial solution. In some cases the 
answer may be to delegate the governance of learning rents to more independent 
external agencies like industrial banks. If the management of the industrial bank is 
less accessible to political pressure, the credibility of withdrawal may be high enough 
to compel learning. Finally, in some cases, ex post rents can work, as in the case of 
the Maruti-Suzuki partnership in India. Here, the instrument was the offer of large ex 
post rents conditional on the transfer of organizational capabilities to domestic 
component producers. This led to a large foreign firm self-selecting to participate in 
the joint venture because it had enough organizational capabilities to believe it could 
transfer the requisite capabilities to Indian firms and thereby capture the ex post rents.   
 
The Political Settlement 
The political settlement describes the distribution of organizational and bargaining 
power across economic, political and bureaucratic organizations in a society (Khan 
1995, 2010). The relative power of different organizations develops in path dependent 
ways, but at any point in time, the description of the political settlement in a country 
is an important ‘independent variable’ in an analysis of the outcomes associated with 
incremental policy changes. Each incremental policy change allocates incremental 
rents to different organizations on specific conditions. The political settlement is 
relevant for understanding the likely outcomes of the policy because it describes the 
capability of organizations to challenge or distort the conditions of rent allocation 
implicit in the formal policy. The outcome in reality may therefore be far removed 
from what the formal policy set out to do, because the rent allocation that the formal 
policy required or the conditions of evaluation and enforcement that it depended on 
could not be enforced in that political settlement.  
 
Rent seeking by powerful organizations refers not just to their expenditure of 
resources in order to influence bureaucrats and politicians. More importantly, it refers 
to their political activities through which they develop their holding power and 
construct coalitions to enhance this holding power. Holding power describes the 
ability of an organization to hold out in prolonged conflicts and it is this capability 
that determines the probability of winning. Holding power depends not just on the 
resources the organization can deploy but also on its power to mobilize support. In a 
developing country this depends on its links with powerful patron-client political 
organizations. Rent seeking contests between organizations have characteristics of 
‘chicken games’ in game theory where a prize can be distributed in two very different 
ways but each requires one side to win and the other to accept defeat. There are thus 
two Nash equilibria but which one emerges depends on the perceptions of each side of 
the holding power of the other. It is only when they each think they can win or if they 
miscalculate the holding power of the other that a conflict ensues which is costly for 
both sides. Conflicts of this type end when a new distribution of holding power is 
accepted by both sides and the distribution of rents reflects this distribution.  
 
The political settlement describes the structure of holding power as it has evolved and 
helps us to understand some of these rent conflicts better. In many developing 
countries, there are many competing political organizations each based on mobilizing 
supporters using patron-client politics. The more such political organizations exist, the 
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easier it is for economic organizations to buy themselves holding power at a relatively 
low price. When political organizations are at the same time powerful and 
fragmented, economic organizations, certainly the bigger and more resourceful ones, 
are likely to find it easy to purchase holding power. On the other hand when the ruling 
coalition includes the most powerful political organizations and the higher levels of 
the ruling coalition have effective control over the lower levels, economic 
organizations can find it much harder to buy themselves holding power and protection 
at an acceptable price. These are the types of differences in the political settlement 
between South Asia and East Asia in the 1960s that we have already referred to.  
 
We have already seen how differences in political settlements can explain why 
apparently similar governance agencies, firm structures and financing instruments can 
result in very different outcomes across countries. South Korea and Pakistan in the 
1960s used fairly similar strategies of providing cheap long-term bank credit and 
export subsidies to large conglomerates in export-oriented sectors. But the outcomes 
were significantly different because their political settlements were different and the 
critical conditions that were required for inducing effort through rent allocation could 
be enforced in one case but not the other (Khan 1999). Indeed even the evolution of 
formal policy was affected in South Asia. As we saw in the case of the Dutt 
Committee report in India, an adverse combination of a particular political settlement 
and a financing instrument made policy-makers give up on evolutionary 
developments of formal policy which they knew were pointless given the holding 
power of powerful economic organizations. Differences in the political settlement can 
also help to explain why effective financing instruments and governance agencies 
have differed so significantly across successful catching-up countries. South Korea, 
Taiwan, China and Malaysia display significant differences in their catching up 
strategies and instruments. The general framework outlined here can explain why a 
different ensemble of instruments and agencies would be effective in inducing high-
effort learning given the differences in their structures of firms and their political 
settlements (Khan 2000b, 2008; Khan and Blankenburg 2009).  
 
Interdependencies Affecting Policies for Learning 
Effective learning strategies require as a precondition an ensemble of conditions to 
ensure high levels of effort. This is not always easy to achieve, and the failure to 
address or even understand these problems has been responsible for the abandonment 
of many learning and technology acquisition strategies across developing countries. 
An important reason why effective policies have been difficult to devise is because 
the variables in eq. [1] have interdependent non-linear effects on effort. This means 
that the best financing instrument, for instance, may depend on the type of political 
settlement and firm structure that a country has inherited. The same instrument may 
be ranked lower than others in its effects on effort in a context with a different 
political settlement and firm structure. As a result, there is no single set of financing 
instruments and governance arrangements that characterize all successful catching up 
countries. It also follows that it is not possible to simply imitate the policies or 
governance structures of more successful developers.  
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Figure 3 The Interdependence of Variables Determining Effort 
 
Some of the interdependencies between the variables affecting effort in eq. [1] are 
shown in Figure 3. From a policy perspective, it is important to distinguish between 
variables that are very difficult to change and which can therefore only be the targets 
of policy in the long term and variables that are easier to change and are more 
immediate policy variables. The variables that are most difficult to change are 
effectively ‘exogenous’ in the short term and policy is likely to have to accept them as 
given. In Figure 3, the political settlement, PS, appears at the top of the list as it is 
likely to be the variable that is most difficult to change. However, even the political 
settlement can of course change, and it can change as a result of political policy, for 
instance through the organization of new political coalitions or movements. Indeed, if 
the political settlement is very unfavourable for organizing any serious process of 
learning, the only meaningful policy would be to begin the process of changing the 
political settlement. Of course, this is a process with unpredictable outcomes and one 
that only political organizations with legitimate leaderships can hope to achieve.  
 
Next in terms of difficulty of changing is the firm structure, FS. The overall firm 
structure may be very slow to change, but policy can still select different groups of 
firms to support, so the firm structure that is targeted by policy is not necessarily 
fixed. Finally, the variables that are usually the most direct targets for policy appear at 
the bottom, the financing instruments, FI, and the associated governance agencies, 
GA, though governance agencies too may not necessarily be easy to set up or change. 
However, even if the policy relevant financing instruments are the only entry points 
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for most policy purposes, the most appropriate financing instruments cannot be 
identified without at least identifying the other variables and the implications for rent 
management in the context defined by those variables. What is ruled out is the hope 
that these variables are ‘additively separable’, so that good financing instruments or 
effective governance agencies can be identified independently of a political economy 
analysis of the interactions between these variables in particular contexts. 
 
5. Policy Conclusions  
The complexity of the relationships between financing instruments, governance 
agencies, firm structures and political settlement can explain why many plausible 
strategies of learning often failed. In many developing countries, strategies of learning 
and catching up between the 1950s to the late 1970s failed because while many new 
sectors and firms emerged, the progression to global competitiveness was too slow. 
Financing costs multiplied and found expression in growing budget deficits or in 
growing non-performing assets of state-owned industrial development banks. 
Eventually, many of these strategies were abandoned, partly because of internal 
reasons, partly because of the global intellectual and policy consensus in favour of 
cutting back subsidies in developing countries in the 1980s.  
 
An intriguing question is whether the countries which eventually abandoned learning 
strategies could have done significantly better had they followed a different approach 
for identifying and addressing the market failures that affected their learning. India 
and Pakistan (of which Bangladesh was a part at that time) attempted ambitious ‘East 
Asian’ industrial policies but without the political settlements that would allow 
effective compulsions for high levels of effort. Large, relatively well-connected firms 
benefited from different types of ‘learning rents’ but managed to buy themselves 
sufficient protection from different factions to prevent threats of subsidy withdrawal 
to be credible. The result was significant industrialization but slow growth towards 
global competitiveness levels (Khan 2000b).  
 
Figure 3 suggests that there could have been two types of responses to this problem 
(apart from abandoning the strategy). The first and more ambitious response would 
have been to use policy to change aspects of the political settlement that were 
preventing the imposition of credible compulsions on the firms receiving rents for 
learning. The political settlement may be difficult to change rapidly, but it is always 
changing endogenously. Could the relevant aspects of the political settlement that 
constrained growth have been addressed by political entrepreneurs if they had a better 
understanding of the constraints? This is a tempting idea but it is not a direction in 
which we should readily go without understanding the dangers. Political settlements 
are complex systems like biological organisms or weather systems. We can 
understand and describe the macro-level features of biological organisms or weather 
systems and this may help us to design micro-interventions like medicines or when to 
take out our umbrellas. However, we are far away from understanding these complex 
systems well enough to attempt to change a biological organism or a weather system 
into another with predictable results. The same is true of political settlements. A 
political intervention like a new party or administrative decentralization will change 
the distribution of power across organizations over time, but we may be surprised at 
the direction of the evolution. To say the least, attempts to change the political 
settlement are highly risky and the results are too uncertain for this to be policy advice 
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that can be given with any confidence. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that political 
movements and struggles as well as economic changes that are going on all the time 
are constantly changing the political settlements of countries.  
 
A second and apparently less ambitious response may be more appropriate. This 
would be to focus on policy choice, but to do so with a fuller understanding of the 
non-linear relationships between the relevant variables. The response would be to 
consider other policy mechanisms for supporting learning in the context of the 
existing political settlement, and feasible changes in governance agencies and firm 
structures such that the incremental rents effectively created a combination of 
incentives and compulsions for learning. We know that in the 1980s a number of 
developing countries that had not performed strongly with ‘traditional’ industrial 
policy nevertheless achieved effective learning outcomes in some sectors. They did 
this because (largely serendipitously) they attempted financing instruments, which 
given the firm selection and the technologies they were acquiring, resulted in credible 
incentives to enhance or transfer organizational capabilities in these sectors. The 
policy challenge in developing countries is to do this matching of compatible 
combinations of variables in a more deliberative and purposive way so that we do not 
have to wait for the next lucky accident to happen.  
 
Much of the policy discussion on technology policy identifies a variety of contracting 
failures but the critical contracting failures that constrain the development of 
competitive organizations have often been ignored. The starting point for any policy 
analysis of technology acquisition is to understand that almost every effective 
learning strategy must involve a component of rent management for developing 
appropriate organizational capabilities. For this, it is not enough to create rents to 
support learning, we have to be sure that these rents come with appropriate and 
enforceable conditions that create credible compulsions for effort. Here a background 
understanding of the current macro-level distribution of power across organizations 
(the political settlement) helps to identify the clusters of firms that are politically 
powerful and therefore likely to present the most serious challenges for effective rent 
management. This does not mean that these firms should be avoided by technology 
policy, but it does mean that technology policy has to give particular attention to how 
issues of effort and rent withdrawal can be managed for these types of firms. It may 
be much easier to drive growth with a different set of firms or sectors where the 
political linkages are less problematic. Indeed, if political stability requires giving 
something to the politically well-connected enterprises, that should be seen as a part 
of political stabilization strategies and not technology policy. Even at the height of its 
reform process, China allowed a number of less efficient public sector enterprises to 
continue operating and receiving rents, as these enterprises protected employment and 
distributed rents to important constituencies even if they had no chance of becoming 
economically viable. These types of redistributive policies are fine as long as we do 
not confuse them with technology policy. In China policy support for enterprises that 
could become globally competitive used other instruments and focused on other 
sectors.  
 
If governance agencies are weak and particularly if the weakness is related to 
characteristics of the political settlement, then financing strategies need to be 
considered which further reduce the monitoring and enforcement requirements for 
governance agencies. For instance, if the political settlement describes a distribution 
30 
 
of power across political organizations that results in intense political competition 
between parties and factions, the imposition of hard rent allocation conditions on 
powerful industrial groups is likely to be difficult as different parties and factions are 
likely to strongly protect their client businesses. An interesting variant of financing 
instruments that can significantly reduce monitoring requirements are those providing 
a significant part of the rents ex post. We have seen a few examples of these in 
developing countries. These financing instruments are not suitable for all sectors and 
technologies but they may be for some. The advantages include self-selection of the 
more appropriate economic organizations to participate in these policies. In addition, 
this type of financing can create strong internal incentives and compulsions for effort 
within the firm because it is investing first and relying on the achievement of 
competitiveness to get the prize of rents later. In some cases, like the Indian 
automobile and Bangladeshi garments cases that we discussed, the financing 
instrument also involved a small number of initial participants or even only one, so 
that the monitoring of the rent allocation conditions was even easier.  
 
Finally, an important general result that can be derived is that the next set of 
successful financing instruments for successful technology acquisition and learning in 
the next developing country will not look exactly like any previous ones. This is 
precisely because of the non-linear interdependencies that we have discussed, which 
make technology policy so challenging. The framework discussed does not give us 
blueprints for financing instruments that can be used in different contexts because 
such blueprints do not exist. However, it goes beyond general recommendations for 
context-specific analysis. It provides a broad analytical framework for discussing 
issues and checking the plausibility of a particular set of financing instruments by 
looking for interdependent relationships that may help or hinder the enforcement of 
conditions for high-effort learning.  
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